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a b s t r a c t 
Due to restricted budgets of relief organizations, costs of hiring transportation service providers steer dis- 
tribution decisions and limit the impact of disaster relief. To improve the success of future humanitarian 
operations, it is of paramount importance to understand this relationship in detail and to identify mitiga- 
tion actions, always considering the interdependencies between multiple independent actors in humani- 
tarian logistics. In this paper, we develop a game-theoretic model in order to investigate the inﬂuence of 
transportation costs on distribution decisions in long-term relief operations and to evaluate measures for 
improving the fulﬁllment of beneﬁciary needs. The equilibrium of the model is a Generalized Nash Equi- 
librium, which has had few applications in the supply chain context to date. We formulate it, utilizing 
the construct of a Variational Equilibrium, as a Variational Inequality and perform numerical simulations 
in order to study the effects of three interventions: an increase in carrier competition, a reduction of 
transportation costs and an extension of framework agreements. The results yield important implications 
for policy makers and humanitarian organizations (HOs). Increasing the number of preselected carriers 
strengthens the bargaining power of HOs and improves impact up to a certain limit. The limit is reached 
when carriers set framework rates equal to transportation unit costs. Reductions of transportation costs 
have a consistently positive, but decreasing marginal beneﬁt without any upper bound. They provide the 
highest beneﬁt when the bargaining power of HOs is weak. On the contrary, extending framework agree- 
ments enables most improvements when the bargaining power of HOs is strong. 
© 2018 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. 
This is an open access article under the CC BY license ( http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ ). 
1. Introduction 
Sudden-onset disasters such as the Indian Ocean tsunami, 
Hurricane Katrina or the Haiti earthquake have had catastrophic 
consequences. Less covered by the media and academics are 
slow-onset disasters ( Bealt, Fernández Barrera, & Mansouri, 2016; 
Leiras, de Brito Jr, Queiroz Peres, Rejane Bertazzo, & Tsugunobu 
Yoshida Yoshizaki, 2014 ). These can actually cause even more 
harm to the affected population than sudden-onset ones, even 
though they allow for longer reaction times ( Long & Wood, 1995 ). 
One striking example is the 800 million people worldwide suf- 
fering from chronic malnutrition due to drought and ﬂooding 
( World Food Programme, 2017 ). During disaster relief operations, 
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humanitarian organizations (HOs) alleviate the suffering of victims 
through the distribution of relief supplies. As the available funds 
are restricted, HOs have to decide on how to allocate limited 
supplies to different groups of beneﬁciaries in order to maximize 
their impact. Quite often, HOs do not succeed on this critical task 
and allocate products in a suboptimal manner ( Benini, Conley, Dit- 
temore, & Waksman, 2009; Nagurney & Nagurney, 2016; Wardell, 
20 09; Waters, 20 01 ). Among the reasons for such misallocations 
are inaccurate need assessments, competition for media attention 
and to some extent conﬂicting donor interests. But also costs 
of transportation often compromise allocation decisions because 
freight is a major spend category in all relief operations and can 
heavily reduce the available budget. Given that HOs largely rely on 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2018.09.045 
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external service providers for transportation, transportation costs 
are, in fact, driven by the freight rates agreed upon with carriers 1 . 
These are extremely high during many relief operations due to 
poor, and often further disaster compromised, transportation 
infrastructure, competition between HOs for limited transportation 
capacity and non-competitive service provider markets ( Benini 
et al., 2009; Cottam, Roe, & Challacombe, 2004; Lall, Wang, & 
Munthali, 2009; Pedersen, 2001; Rancourt, Bellavance, & Goentzel, 
2014; Rizet & Hine, 1993; Samii & Van Wassenhove, 2003; Tera- 
vaninthorn & Raballand, 2009 ). Hence, the negotiation of trans- 
portation rates and the selection of service providers are highly 
critical for the success of relief operations. Doing this for each 
load individually would, however, cause a tremendous operational 
effort. Therefore, HOs often set up framework agreements with 
carriers in advance of distribution, which ﬁx transportation rates 
for all transportation orders during a speciﬁed period of time (up 
to three years) and are renewed at ﬁxed intervals ( Pazirandeh & 
Herlin, 2014; Rancourt et al., 2014 ). These are also favored by car- 
riers because they supersede repeated requests for quotation and 
allow them to build close, long-term business relationships. It is 
due to the volatile character of disaster relief operations that HOs 
and carriers have to set up these agreements under very high un- 
certainty, for example, without knowing the future needs of ben- 
eﬁciaries or the budget available for the operation. In light of this 
complex environment, HOs and policy makers wonder how they 
can best intervene in order to mitigate the existing limitations and 
increase the impact of disaster relief. Predicting the effect of such 
interventions requires a detailed understanding of how framework 
agreements are negotiated in disaster relief and how they inﬂu- 
ence the selection of providers and the allocation of relief items. 
Literature in this regard is very limited and does not provide 
suﬃcient insights. In general, there is a lack of quantitative mod- 
els which take into account the huge interdependencies between 
many independent decision makers ( Gutjahr & Nolz, 2016; Leiras 
et al., 2014; Muggy & L. Heier Stamm, 2014 ). Studies such as those 
of Rancourt et al. (2014) , Teravaninthorn and Raballand (2009) and 
Lall et al. (2009) do shed light on the drivers of transportation 
rates, but are rather macroeconomic and cannot explain individ- 
ual behavior. The same is true for the research on relief alloca- 
tion by Benini et al. (2009) . Papers by Paul and Wang (2015) , 
Bagchi, Paul, and Maloni (2011) and Trestrail, Paul, and Maloni 
(2009) provide insights with regard to the selection of transporta- 
tion service providers, but do not consider the interdependencies 
between different HOs and their implications for distribution de- 
cisions. Furthermore, the literature on framework agreements and 
option-based contracts for the procurement of relief items ( Balcik 
& Ak, 2014; Iakovou, Vlachos, Keramydas, & Partsch, 2014; Liang, 
Wang, & Gao, 2012; Wang, Feng Li, Liang Liang, Zhimin Huang, & 
Allan Ashley, 2015 ) can act as a reference, but results cannot be 
transferred to transportation services without adaptations because 
of the absence of storage and obsolescence costs in the service sec- 
tor. The most promising starting points for developing an answer 
to the above questions are, therefore, a number of game-theoretic 
papers dealing with relief allocation ( Nagurney, 2018; Nagurney & 
Nagurney, 2016 ) and service provider selection ( Nagurney, 2016; 
Nagurney, Daniele, Alvarez Flores, & Caruso, 2018 ). However, these 
examine the two connected topics separately and cannot explain 
the existing interdependencies. Furthermore, they focus on short- 
term operations and do not take into account important aspects 
such as framework agreements, budget constraints, sustainability 
objectives and long-term business interests. 
1 When using the term “carrier” in this paper, we refer to logistics service 
providers offering transportation services. 
We address this gap in the literature by developing a game- 
theoretic model of the described setting and analyzing its equilib- 
rium values under various conditions. Game theory is well-suited 
to study the divergent interests of multiple stakeholders in human- 
itarian logistics ( Gutjahr & Nolz, 2016 ), and equilibrium models are 
excellent tools to analyze the outcome of interactions of multiple 
actors from the perspective of policy makers ( Toyasaki, Daniele, 
& Wakolbinger, 2014 ). The proposed model consists of two sub- 
models. In the ﬁrst sub-model, several HOs and carriers simultane- 
ously negotiate framework agreements for transportation services. 
In the second sub-model, the same HOs simultaneously make dis- 
tribution decisions, that is, they all decide at the same time on the 
volume of relief items to be purchased, on the distribution points 
to be supplied and on the carriers to be used for transportation. 
The link between both sub-models is unidirectional. On the one 
hand, HOs take into account the framework agreements negotiated 
in the ﬁrst sub-model for their distribution decisions in the sec- 
ond sub-model. On the other hand, when negotiating framework 
agreements in the ﬁrst sub-model, they have no information about 
key parameters of the second sub-model, for example the available 
budget or the actual needs of beneﬁciaries (incomplete information 
across sub-models). What is more, given the extremely high un- 
certainty of disaster relief and the potentially long temporal off-set 
between both sub-models, they are not even able to assign a rea- 
sonable probability distribution to the possible parameter values 
(no beliefs about future states of nature). This lack of information 
is reinforced by the fact that the decision makers at HOs change 
from the ﬁrst to the second sub-model. While the more strategic 
decisions of Sub-model 1 are taken at headquarters or country of- 
ﬁces, the more operational decisions of Sub-model 2 are taken by 
staff in the ﬁeld. 
For the described reasons (very high uncertainty, long temporal 
offset, change in decision makers) it is of minor importance and 
practicality for decision-makers of Sub-model 1 to anticipate the 
outcomes of Sub-model 2. Moreover, given the complexity of each 
actor’s behavior and the absence of reasonable ex-ante beliefs, 
analyzing the two sub-models as a multi-stage game would be 
technically hardly solvable. Therefore, we investigate each sub- 
model as a single-stage game. Within both of these single-stage 
games, all actors have complete information and behave strate- 
gically by aligning their decisions to the expected behavior of 
all other actors. This situation can usually be described by a 
classical Nash Equilibrium (NE) ( Nash, 1951; 1950 ). Re-formulating 
a NE as variational inequality and calculating its values based 
on corresponding algorithms has developed into a common ap- 
proach for supply chain network problems (cf. Nagurney, 1999 and 
the references therein). What makes our model mathematically 
and computationally challenging, however, is the behavior of 
HOs. These compete for limited transportation capacity and conse- 
quently share common constraints. Therefore, the particular part of 
the model is no longer simply a NE but rather a Generalized Nash 
Equilibrium (GNE) (see Fischer, Herrich, & Schönefeld, 2014 and 
von Heusinger, 2009 ). The applications of GNE models to supply 
chains are very recent and few in number (see Nagurney, 2018; 
Nagurney, Yu, & Besik, 2017 and Nagurney & Nagurney, 2016 ). 
For calculating the respective GNE of our model, we ﬁrst appeal 
to the recently introduced concept of a Variational Equilibrium 
(cf. Facchinei, Fischer, & Piccialli, 2007 and Kulkarni & Shanbhag, 
2012 ). This concept allows us to also formulate the HOs’ GNE 
problem as a variational inequality rather than a quasi-variational 
inequality. Algorithms for variational inequality problems are in a 
more advanced state than those for quasi-variational inequalities. 
Consequently, we are able to perform extensive numerical simu- 
lations regarding the potential of different interventions by policy 
makers and HOs with feasible computational effort. 
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Fig. 1. Structure of the model. 
In summary, we make the following contributions. First, we add 
depth to the existing studies of transportation markets in disaster 
relief by shedding light on the negotiation of framework agree- 
ments between multiple self-interested actors and the interrela- 
tion of these framework agreements with distribution decisions of 
competing organizations. This deepened understanding of individ- 
ual decision-making is extremely helpful for predicting the effect 
of interventions by policy makers and HOs. A numerical compar- 
ison of the effect of multiple such interventions is another con- 
tribution of this paper. Furthermore, the presented model is the 
ﬁrst in this context to incorporate budget constraints, sustainabil- 
ity objectives and long-term business interests, which are essential 
characteristics of long-term relief operations. Accordingly, we help 
to develop the under-researched ﬁeld of slow-onset and long-term 
disasters. Finally, we address the lack of quantitative models for 
humanitarian logistics which take into account the interdependen- 
cies between many independent actors, and widen the rare appli- 
cations of GNE to supply chain problems. The paper is structured 
as follows: In the next section, we present the game-theoretic 
model and the equilibrium conditions. In Section 3 , we illustrate 
the model with a brief numerical example. Then, in Section 4 , we 
perform simulations to assess the effects of different interventions 
by policy makers and HOs on the equilibrium values. Finally, we 
close the paper with a summary and an outlook in Section 5 . 
2. Game-theoretic model 
The model that we construct in this section describes the dis- 
tribution of relief supplies as part of long-term relief operations; 
for example, as in response to slow-onset disasters such as chronic 
famine in Africa. However, we do not intend to model a speciﬁc 
relief operation, but rather provide an abstraction of the decision 
processes within such operations in order to derive generic conclu- 
sions. As illustrated in Fig. 1 , the model includes H humanitarian 
organizations, with a typical humanitarian organization denoted by 
h , L preselected carriers, with a typical carrier denoted by l , and D 
distribution points, with a typical distribution point denoted by d . 
Furthermore, besides the L speciﬁc carriers, we consider a general 
spot market for transportation services which is denoted by L + 1 . 
HOs purchase relief items and contract carriers for the trans- 
portation of these products to different distribution points. From 
there, multiple individuals affected by a disaster are supplied. In 
order to contract carriers, HOs, on the one hand, set up framework 
agreements with preselected carriers in advance of distribution de- 
cisions. On the other hand, HOs contract carriers ad-hoc on the 
spot market if they cannot or do not want to make use of the 
framework agreements. While framework rates are the result of 
negotiations, spot market rates are externally given market prices 
and beyond the inﬂuence of single HOs. 
We model this situation using two temporally offset sub- 
models. In the preceding Sub-model 1, H HOs negotiate and sign 
framework agreements for transportation services with L prese- 
Table 1 
Variables. 
Sub-model 1 
x hld Volume projected by h for transport with l to d 
X h ∈ R L ·D + Vector of all x hld for h 
X l ∈ R H·D + Vector of all x hld for l 
X ∈ R H·L ·D + Vector of all x hld 
p hld Rate for transportation from h to d with l 
P h ∈ R L ·D + Vector of all p hld for h 
P l ∈ R H·D + Vector of all p hld for l 
P ∈ R H·L ·D + Vector of all p hld 
λM 
hd 
Lagrange multiplier for constraints (1b) 
λM ∈ R H·D + Vector of all λM hd 
λG 
l 
Lagrange multiplier for constraints (1c) 
λG ∈ R L + Vector of all λG l 
Sub-model 2 
y hld Volume transported by l to d on behalf of h 
Y h ∈ R (L +1) ·D + Vector of all y hld for h 
Y l ∈ R H·D + Vector of all y hld for l 
Y ∈ R H·(L +1) ·D + Vector of all y hld 
λB 
h 
Lagrange multiplier for constraints (15b) 
λB ∈ R H + Vector of all λB h 
λK 
ld 
Lagrange multiplier for constraints (15c) 
λK ∈ R L ·D + Vector of all λK ld 
Table 2 
Parameters. 
Sub-model 1 
M hd h ’s volume of framework agreements for transport to d 
G l Maximum transportation volume for l 
p r 
hld 
Reservation price of h for transport with l to d 
c t 
ld 
Transportation unit costs of l for transport to d 
Sub-model 2 
B h Budget of h 
K ld Capacity of l for transportation to d 
c p 
h 
Purchasing unit costs of h 
n d Needs of beneﬁciaries at d 
p h (L +1) d Rate h has to pay on spot market for transport to d 
P L +1 ∈ R H·D + Vector of all p h (L +1) d 
lected carriers. They do this under vast uncertainty, not knowing 
the values or probability distributions of future spot market rates, 
beneﬁciary needs, carrier capacities or ﬁnancial budgets. These 
parameters are only revealed in the subsequent Sub-model 2, in 
which the same H HOs decide on the volume of relief items to be 
purchased, on the distribution points to be supplied and on the 
carriers to be used for transportation. For the latter, they consider 
the prevailing spot market rates and the framework agreements 
from Sub-model 1. While framework rates are ﬁxed for all orders 
during the duration of the agreements, framework volumes are 
only projections and non-binding for any of the parties ( Pazirandeh 
& Herlin, 2014; Rancourt et al., 2014 ). Nevertheless, HOs use the 
agreed volumes as upper bounds for carrier assignments in Sub- 
model 2 because, in the interest of sustainability, they want to 
limit the dependency of local companies on business with the 
humanitarian sector (for details see Section 2.1.1 ). Given the long 
duration of framework agreements, Sub-model 2 takes place re- 
peatedly after the ﬁnalization of Sub-model 1, which is only rerun 
after the expiration of the agreements. We will now present both 
sub-models and their respective equilibrium conditions separately. 
The variables, parameters, functions and weights are given in 
Tables 1–3 respectively. Recall that all actors behave strategically 
and, in the equilibrium of the sub-models, align their decisions 
to the equilibrium decisions of all other actors. We use the 
superscript ∗ whenever referring to such equilibrium values. 
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Table 3 
Functions and weights. 
Sub-model 1 
C h (X h , P 
∗
h 
) Transportation costs of h 
R h ( X ) Dependency risk of h 
ω R 
h 
Relative importance of risk compared to costs for h 
E l ( P , X 
∗) Expected proﬁt of l 
S l ( P ) Satisfaction with l 
ω S 
l 
Relative importance of satisfaction compared to proﬁt for l 
Sub-model 2 
I h ( Y ) Impact of h 
A h ( Y ) Activity signal of h 
ω A 
h 
Relative importance of signaling compared to impact for h 
2.1. Sub-model 1: Negotiation of framework agreements 
In this sub-model, H HOs negotiate framework agreements with 
L preselected carriers. Similar to competitive bidding, carriers com- 
pete in terms of the rates offered for transportation to different 
distribution points. They set rates p hld in order to maximize the 
weighted sum of expected proﬁt and customer satisfaction, consid- 
ering the transportation volumes projected by HOs. These, in turn, 
are interested in ensuring a certain projected transportation capac- 
ity by means of framework agreements and target to minimize the 
weighted sum of the related costs and risk. Anticipating the rates 
of carriers, they decide on the breakdown X h of projected volumes 
across carriers. Both ﬁxed rates p ∗
hld 
and projected volumes x ∗
hld 
are 
then recorded as part of the framework agreements. 
2.1.1. Behavior of HOs 
Each HO h ;h = 1 , . . . , H knows that its ﬁnancial budget in 
Sub-model 2 will be restricted, but it does not know at which 
level. Therefore, when setting up framework agreements, it seeks 
to ensure a predeﬁned service level at minimal costs ( Balcik & 
Ak, 2014 ). In other words, it targets to enter into framework 
agreements which collectively secure the transportation capacity 
M hd for each distribution point d; d = 1 , . . . , D while minimizing 
the costs of transportation C h . 
2 . Being a cost minimizer, HO h 
will in general favor carriers which offer low transportation rates. 
However, the more relative volume it assigns to single carriers, the 
more it becomes dependent on these carriers and the higher is the 
impact if some of these carriers are not able or willing to provide 
the promised transportation capacity in Sub-model 2. This could 
happen when carriers decide to pursue more proﬁtable business 
opportunities ( Rancourt et al., 2014 ) or plead “force majeur” in 
the case of disaster-related disruptions ( Egan, 2010 ), because their 
interests might not be aligned with the humanitarian objectives 
( Carland, Goentzel, & Montibeller, 2018 ). Therefore, HO h also 
strives to minimize its dependency risk R h by distributing the 
projected volumes in an appropriate manner across multiple 
providers ( Balcik & Ak, 2014 ). This is reasonable behavior for orga- 
nizations operating in environments with high service and supply 
risk ( Meena, Sarmah, & Sarkar, 2011 ). In addition, HOs also want 
to avoid an immoderate dependency of carriers on business with 
humanitarian organizations, because it would hinder a sustain- 
able development of the local transportation market. Therefore, 
they make sure that no carrier l; l = 1 , . . . , L is assigned volumes 
exceeding an upper threshold G l 
3 . For example, the Red Cross 
2 For this paper, we consider the parameter M hd as externally given and examine 
its inﬂuence in Section 4 . A reasonable approach for determining it mathematically 
would, however, be an interesting topic for future research. 
3 For the model to be feasible, the parameters G l and M hd need to fulﬁll the con- 
dition 
∑ L 
l=1 G l ≥
∑ H 
h =1 
∑ D 
d=1 M hd . As this is a reasonable assumption, we will select 
the parameters for our numerical analysis accordingly. 
does not procure more than 30% of a supplier’s total production 
volume ( Rosenkranz, 2017 ) and the WFP assigns transportation 
volumes to carriers proportionally to their total transportation 
capacity ( Rancourt et al., 2014 ). Then, each h ;h = 1 , . . . , H faces 
the following optimization problem: 
minimize 
X h 
C h (X h , P 
∗
h ) + ω R h · R h (X ) (1a) 
subject to 
L ∑ 
l=1 
x hld ≥ M hd , d = 1 , . . . , D (1b) 
H ∑ 
i =1 
D ∑ 
d=1 
x ild ≤ G l , l = 1 , . . . , L (1c) 
x hld ≥ 0 , l = 1 , . . . , L ;d = 1 , . . . , D. (1d) 
Objective function (1a) minimizes the weighted sum of trans- 
portation costs and dependency risk. Constraint (1b) ensures that 
HO h assigns suﬃcient volume to cover the desired transporta- 
tion volume for each distribution point. Constraint (1c) secures 
that the maximum volume is not exceeded for any carrier. Con- 
straint (1d) guarantees the non-negativity of x hld . 
We assume the objective function (1a) to be twice continuously 
differentiable and strictly convex. Furthermore, we deﬁne the fea- 
sible set K 1 
h 
for each HO h as 
K 
1 
h ≡ { X h | (1 b) and (1 d ) hold } (2) 
and we let K 1 ≡ ∏ H h =1 K 1 h . In addition, we deﬁne the feasible set S 1 
consisting of the shared constraints as 
S 1 ≡ { X | (1 c) holds } . (3) 
Observe that not only does the disutility of each HO (1a) de- 
pend on the strategies of the other HOs, that is, the projected 
transportation volumes, but so does the feasible set because of the 
common constraints (1c) . Hence, the above game-theoretic model, 
in which the HOs compete non-cooperatively, is a Generalized 
Nash Equilibrium problem. We now state the following deﬁnition 
in the context of Sub-model 1; for adaptations to other disaster 
relief models see Nagurney, Alvarez Flores, and Soylu (2016) and 
Nagurney et al. (2018) . 
Deﬁnition 1 (Generalized Nash Equilibrium) . A vector of all trans- 
portation volumes projected by HOs, X ∗ ∈ K 1 ∩ S 1 , constitutes a 
Generalized Nash Equilibrium if for each HO h ; h = 1 , . . . , H: 
U h (X 
∗
h , 
ˆ X ∗h ) ≥ U h (X h , ˆ X ∗h ) , ∀ X h ∈ K 1 h ∩ S 1 , (4) 
where ˆ X ∗
h 
≡ (X ∗
1 
, . . . , X ∗
h −1 , X 
∗
h +1 , . . . , X 
∗
H 
) and U h (X ) = −[ C h (X h , P ∗h ) + 
ω R 
h 
· R h (X )] ; h = 1 , . . . , H. 
Hence, a Generalized Nash Equilibrium is established if no HO 
can unilaterally improve upon its utility by changing its projec- 
tion of transportation volumes in the network, given the trans- 
portation volume projections of the other HOs, and subject to 
the volume requirement constraints (1b) , the shared/coupling con- 
straints (1c) and the non-negativity constraints (1d) . We remark 
that K 1 
h 
;h = 1 , . . . , H, K 1 , and S 1 are convex sets. 
If there are no coupling, that is, shared, constraints in the above 
model, then X and X ∗ in Deﬁnition 1 need only lie in the set K 1 , 
and, under the assumption of convexity of the disutility functions 
and that they are continuously differentiable, we know that (cf. 
Gabay & Moulin, 1980 and Nagurney, 1999 ) the solution to what 
would then be a Nash equilibrium problem (see Nash, 1951; Nash, 
1950 ) would coincide with the solution of the following variational 
inequality (VI) problem: determine X ∗ ∈ K 1 , such that 
−
H ∑ 
h =1 
〈∇ X h U h (X ∗) , X h − X ∗h 〉 ≥ 0 , ∀ X ∈ K 1 , (5) 
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where 〈·, ·〉 denotes the inner product in the corresponding Eu- 
clidean space and ∇ X h U h (X ) denotes the gradient of U h ( X ) with re- 
spect to X h . 
As emphasized in Nagurney et al. (2017) , a reﬁnement of the 
Generalized Nash Equilibrium is what is known as a variational 
equilibrium and it is a speciﬁc type of GNE (see Facchinei et al., 
2007 and Kulkarni & Shanbhag, 2012 ). Speciﬁcally, in a GNE de- 
ﬁned by a variational equilibrium, the Lagrange multipliers asso- 
ciated with the shared/coupling constraints are all the same. This 
implies that all humanitarian organizations share a common per- 
ception of the sustainable upper demand limit of a service provider 
and behave similarly in order to respect it. Given that sustainabil- 
ity is a common objective of all HOs, we consider this a reasonable 
assumption. More precisely, we have the following deﬁnition: 
Deﬁnition 2 (Variational Equilibrium) . A strategy vector X ∗ is said 
to be a variational equilibrium of the above Generalized Nash Equi- 
librium game if X ∗ ∈ K 1 ∩ S 1 is a solution of the variational in- 
equality 
−
H ∑ 
h =1 
〈∇ X h U h (X ∗) , X h − X ∗h 〉 ≥ 0 , ∀ X ∈ K 1 ∩ S 1 . (6) 
By utilizing a variational equilibrium, we can take advantage of 
the well-developed theory of variational inequalities, including al- 
gorithms which are in a more advanced state of development and 
application than algorithms for quasi-variational inequality prob- 
lems (cf. Nagurney, 1999 and the references therein). 
We now expand the terms in variational inequality (6) . 
Theorem 1 (VI Formulation of the GNE in Sub-model 
1) . Speciﬁcally, we have that (6) is equivalent to the variational 
inequality: determine X ∗ ∈ K 1 ∩ S 1 , such that 
H ∑ 
h =1 
L ∑ 
l=1 
D ∑ 
d=1 
[
∂C h (X 
∗
h 
, P ∗
h 
) 
∂x hld 
+ ω R h ·
∂R h (X 
∗) 
∂x hld 
]
×
[
x hld − x ∗hld 
]
≥ 0 , 
∀ X ∈ K 1 ∩ S 1 . (7) 
Proof of the above follows through the use of the deﬁnition and 
the expansion of the gradient terms. 
Remark 1 (Existence and Uniqueness of Solution) . A solution to 
(7) is guaranteed to exist from the classical theory of variational 
inequalities (cf. Kinderlehrer & Stampacchia, 1980 and Nagurney, 
1999 ) since the function that enters the variational inequality is 
continuous and the feasible set is compact. Furthermore, since the 
function entering (7) is strictly monotone, the solution to the vari- 
ational inequality (7) is unique. 
Remark 2 (Alternative Variational Inequality to (7)) . We now uti- 
lize the Lagrange multipliers associated with the constraints as de- 
ﬁned in Table 1 . Then, an equivalent variational inequality to that 
of (7) , which we will use to construct the variational inequality for 
the complete supply chain network (see, e.g., Nagurney, 2018 ), is 
the following one: 
Find (X ∗, λM 
∗
, λG 
∗
) ∈ R H ·L ·D + H ·D + L + : 
H ∑ 
h =1 
L ∑ 
l=1 
D ∑ 
d=1 
[
∂C h (X 
∗
h 
, P ∗
h 
) 
∂x hld 
+ ω R h ·
∂R h (X 
∗) 
∂x hld 
− λM hd 
∗ + λG l 
∗
]
×
[
x hld − x ∗hld 
]
+ 
H ∑ 
h =1 
D ∑ 
d=1 
[ 
−M hd + 
L ∑ 
l=1 
x ∗hld 
] 
×
[
λM hd − λM hd 
∗]
+ 
L ∑ 
l=1 
[ 
G l −
H ∑ 
i =1 
D ∑ 
d=1 
x ∗ild 
] 
×
[
λG l − λG l 
∗] ≥ 0 , 
∀ (X, λM , λG ) ∈ R H ·L ·D + H ·D + L + . (8) 
2.1.2. Behavior of carriers 
A carrier l; l = 1 , . . . , L aims to maximize the weighted sum of 
its expected proﬁt E l and customer satisfaction S l . Proﬁt results 
from charging transportation rates p hld greater than the unit trans- 
portation costs c t 
ld 
and will be realized once HOs make use of the 
framework agreements in Sub-model 2. Therefore, carrier l esti- 
mates its proﬁt E l based on the projected transportation volumes 
X ∗ and the transportation rates P . Besides optimizing the proﬁt 
for the current framework agreement, carriers are also interested 
in extending the business beyond the current horizon. HOs’ will- 
ingness to further use the carrier in the future depends on their 
customer satisfaction, which is determined by the HOs’ perception 
of price fairness ( Bolton & Lemon, 1999 ). High transportation rates 
might be acceptable in the short-term, but can lead to dissatisfac- 
tion and a search for alternative carriers in the long-term ( Oum, 
Waters, & Yong, 1992 ). As a consequence, service providers use 
prices to secure the loyalty of customers ( Cram, 1996 ). This could, 
for example, be observed during the Afghanistan crisis when lo- 
cal carriers decided to lower transportation rates to avoid the de- 
ployment of a UN transport ﬂeet ( Samii & Van Wassenhove, 2003 ). 
Therefore, we consider the customer satisfaction S l with carrier l as 
part of carrier l ’s objective function and assume that S l depends on 
the agreed transportation rates 4 . Then, each carrier l; l = 1 , . . . , L 
faces the following optimization problem: 
maximize 
P l 
E l (P, X 
∗) + ω S l · S l (P ) (9a) 
subject to c t ld ≤ p hld ≤ p r hld , h = 1 , . . . , H, d = 1 , . . . , D . (9b) 
Objective function (9a) maximizes the weighted sum of ex- 
pected proﬁt and customer satisfaction. Constraint (9b) guarantees 
that the rate p hld carrier l charges h for transport to d will not be 
less than its transportation unit costs c t 
ld 
and that no humanitar- 
ian organization h will pay a rate beyond its reservation price p r 
hld 
. 
The reservation price p r 
hld 
is deﬁned as the maximum price orga- 
nization h is willing to pay for transportation with carrier l to dis- 
tribution point d ( Kalish & Nelson, 1991 ). 
We assume the objective function to be twice continuously dif- 
ferentiable and strictly concave. Furthermore, we deﬁne the feasi- 
ble set K 2 
l 
for each carrier l as: 
K 
2 
l = { P l | ( 9b ) holds } . (10) 
and we let K 2 ≡ ∏ L l=1 K 2 l . We remark that K 2 l ; l = 1 , . . . , L and K 2 
are convex sets. 
Deﬁnition 3 (Nash Equilibrium) . A price pattern P ∗ ∈ K 2 is a Nash 
Equilibrium if for each carrier l ; l = 1 , . . . L : 
U l (P ∗l , ˆ P 
∗
l ) ≥ U l (P l , ˆ P ∗l ) , ∀ P ∈ K 2 , (11) 
where U l (P ) ≡ E l (P, X ∗) + ω S l · S l (P ) and ˆ P ∗l ≡ (P ∗1 , . . . , P ∗l−1 , 
P ∗
l+1 , . . . , P 
∗
L 
) . 
Then, following Gabay and Moulin (1980) and Nagurney (1999) , 
the below result is immediate under our assumptions: 
Theorem 2 (VI Formulation of NE in Sub-model 1) . A price vector 
P ∗ is a Nash Equilibrium if and only if P ∗ ∈ K 2 is a solution of the 
variational inequality: 
−
L ∑ 
l=1 
H ∑ 
h =1 
D ∑ 
d=1 
[
∂E l (P 
∗, X ∗) 
∂ p hld 
+ ω S l ·
∂S l (P 
∗) 
∂ p hld 
]
×
[
p hld − p ∗hld 
]
≥ 0 , 
∀ P ∈ K 2 . (12) 
4 According to the service management literature, customer satisfaction is the re- 
sult of perceived service quality relative to the price ( Hallowell, 1996 ). We leave 
service quality out of our analysis (by assuming it to be homogenous across carri- 
ers) and focus on the effects of prices. 
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Remark 3 (Existence and Uniqueness of Solution) . A solution P ∗
of prices to the variational inequality problem (12) is guaranteed 
to exist since the function entering (12) is continuous under the 
imposed assumptions and the feasible set is compact. Furthermore, 
since the function entering (12) is strictly monotone, the solution 
to the variational inequality (12) is unique. 
2.1.3. Supply chain network equilibrium 
After characterizing the equilibrium conditions for HOs and car- 
riers in Sub-model 1 separately, we now provide the equilibrium 
conditions for the complete, multi-tiered supply chain (SC) net- 
work. In order to formalize the agreement between the tiers, the 
transportation volume projections and the price patterns have to 
coincide and to satisfy the sum of the two variational inequalities 
(8) and (12) . Such a consideration leads us to the following deﬁni- 
tion. 
Deﬁnition 4 (SC Network Equilibrium) . The equilibrium state of 
the supply chain network consisting of HOs and carriers is one 
where the volume projections and the transportation rates coin- 
cide and they and the Lagrange multipliers satisfy the sum of in- 
equalities (8) and (12) . 
The following theorem is, hence, immediate. 
Theorem 3 (VI Formulation of SC Network Equilibrium in Sub- 
model 1) . A pattern of volume projections, transportation rates and 
Lagrange multipliers is a supply chain network equilibrium according 
to the above deﬁnition if and only if it satisﬁes the following varia- 
tional inequality: 
Find (X ∗, λM 
∗
, λG 
∗
, P ∗) ∈ R H ·L ·D + H ·D + L + × K 2 : 
H ∑ 
h =1 
L ∑ 
l=1 
D ∑ 
d=1 
[
∂C h (X 
∗
h 
, P ∗
h 
) 
∂x hld 
+ ω R h ·
∂R h (X 
∗) 
∂x hld 
− λM hd 
∗ + λG l 
∗
]
×
[
x hld − x ∗hld 
]
+ 
H ∑ 
h =1 
D ∑ 
d=1 
[ 
−M hd + 
L ∑ 
l=1 
x ∗hld 
] 
×
[
λM hd − λM hd 
∗]
+ 
L ∑ 
l=1 
[ 
G l −
H ∑ 
i =1 
D ∑ 
d=1 
x ∗ild 
] 
×
[
λG l − λG l 
∗]
−
L ∑ 
l=1 
H ∑ 
h =1 
D ∑ 
d=1 
[
∂E l (P 
∗, X ∗) 
∂ p hld 
+ ω S l ·
∂S l (P 
∗) 
∂ p hld 
]
×
[
p hld − p ∗hld 
]
≥ 0 , 
∀ (X, λM , λG , P ) ∈ R H ·L ·D + H ·D + L + × K 2 . (13) 
We now put variational inequality (13) , which is the uniﬁed 
variational inequality, into standard form (see Nagurney, 1999 ), 
that is: determine z ∗ ∈ K ⊂ R N , such that 
〈 F (z ∗) , z − z ∗〉 ≥ 0 , ∀ z ∈ K, (14) 
where F is a given continuous function from K to R N , and K a 
closed, convex set, with both the vectors F ( z ) and z being column 
vectors. 
We deﬁne z 1 as the vector: z 1 ≡ ( X , λM , λG , P ), the 
feasible set K 1 as K 1 ≡ R H ·L ·D + H ·D + L + × K 2 , and F 1 (z 1 ) ≡
(F 1 1 (z 1 ) , F 
2 
1 (z 1 ) , F 
3 
1 
(z 1 ) , F 
4 
1 (z 1 )) , where component hld of 
F 1 
1 
(z 1 ) = ∂C h (X h ,P h ) ∂x hld + ω 
R 
h 
· ∂R h (X ) 
∂x hld 
− λM 
hd 
+ λG 
l 
( h = 1 , . . . , H, l = 
1 , . . . , L, d = 1 , . . . , D ); component hd of F 2 
1 
(z 1 ) = −M hd + 
∑ L 
l=1 x hld 
( h = 1 , . . . , H, d = 1 , . . . , D ); component l of F 3 
1 
(z 1 ) = G l −∑ H 
i =1 
∑ D 
d=1 x ild ( l = 1 , . . . , L ), and component hld of F 4 1 (z 1 ) = 
∂E l (P,X ) 
∂ p hld 
+ ω S 
l 
· ∂S l (P) 
∂ p hld 
( h = 1 , . . . , H, l = 1 , . . . , L, d = 1 , . . . , D ). Here 
N = 2 · H · L · D + H · D + L . Then, clearly, (13) takes on the standard 
form (14) . 
2.2. Sub-model 2: Distribution decisions 
In this sub-model, humanitarian organizations decide on the 
volume of relief items to be purchased, on the distribution points 
to be supplied and on the carriers to be used for transportation 5 . 
They can either contract carriers ad hoc on the spot market or 
make use of the previously negotiated framework agreements. Dif- 
ferent from Sub-model 1, they now have visibility on spot market 
rates, beneﬁciary needs, disposable ﬁnancial budgets and available 
carrier capacities. Due to opportunistic decisions of carriers, the 
available capacity might, in fact, be different from what was as- 
sumed in Sub-model 1. In the interest of focus, however, we do not 
explicitly model these decisions of carriers in Sub-model 2. Instead, 
we assume the decision, how much of their available capacity they 
dedicate to business with humanitarian organizations, as externally 
given. In Sub-model 2, carriers are then considered “order-takers”
who accept all transportation orders up to their offered capacity 
limit. 
A humanitarian organization h ;h = 1 , . . . , H seeks to maximize 
the weighted sum of its impact I h and activity signal A h . HOs have 
primarily altruistic motivations ( Wardell, 2009 ) and target to pro- 
duce impact by reducing the suffering and deprivation of people 
( Holguín-Veras, Pérez, Jaller, Van Wassenhove, & Aros-Vera, 2013 ). 
Using output indicators as proxies ( Hofmann, Roberts, Shoham, & 
Harvey, 2004 ), they estimate the achieved impact based on the 
needs of beneﬁciaries n d at distribution point d , their own volume 
of goods provided and the volume of goods provided by other HOs. 
However, HOs have also other organizational objectives ( Benini 
et al., 2009 ). For example, they are continuously competing for do- 
nations ( Altay & Pal, 2014 ). In this context, they use distribution 
volumes to signal their performance to donors as these base their 
donation decisions on the observed relief volumes ( Wardell, 2009 ). 
Consequently, by distributing products to beneﬁciaries, HO h gen- 
erates an activity signal A h , which positively inﬂuences future do- 
nation amounts and therefore provides utility for h . 
Obviously, HOs cannot decide on distribution volumes without 
limitations. Although costs are of lower concern in disaster relief 
( Gralla, Goentzel, & Fine, 2014 ), especially when beneﬁciaries’ de- 
privation costs are very high ( Holguín-Veras et al., 2013 ), HOs typ- 
ically have to deal with limited and earmarked budgets B h , which 
can strongly inﬂuence distribution decisions ( Burkart, Besiou, & 
Wakolbinger, 2016; Gutjahr & Nolz, 2016 ). Accordingly, HOs take 
into account purchase prices c 
p 
h 
, negotiated framework rates p ∗
hld 
( l = 1 , . . . , L ) and externally given spot market rates p ∗
h (L +1) d (for 
the simplicity of notation) when deciding on purchasing and distri- 
bution volumes. 6 Similarly, transportation capacities of carriers are 
often limited in disaster relief ( Benini et al., 2009 ). Hence, HOs also 
take into account the available capacity K ld of carrier l for trans- 
portation to distribution point d . Then, each HO h ;h = 1 , . . . , H
faces the following optimization problem in Sub-model 2: 
maximize 
Y h 
I h (Y ) + ω A h · A h (Y ) (15a) 
subject to 
L +1 ∑ 
l=1 
D ∑ 
d=1 
(c p 
h 
+ p ∗hld ) · y hld ≤ B h (15b) 
H ∑ 
i =1 
y ild ≤ K ld , l = 1 , . . . , L + 1 , d = 1 , . . . , D (15c) 
5 We assume that all purchased volumes are also transported to distribution 
points. Therefore, we only use the variable y hld as deﬁned in Table 1 and highlight 
that volumes purchased by h can be calculated as 
∑ L +1 
l=1 
∑ D 
d=1 y hld . 
6 Please note that also purchase prices might be regulated by framework agree- 
ments with product suppliers. However, due to our speciﬁc research interest, we do 
not model the negotiation of purchase prices, but consider them as externally given 
in our model. 
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0 ≤ y hld ≤ x ∗hld , l = 1 , . . . , L, d = 1 , . . . , D (15d) 
0 ≤ y h (L +1) d , d = 1 , . . . , D (15e) 
The objective function (15a) maximizes the weighted sum of 
impact I h and activity signal A h . Constraint (15b) ensures that 
HO h does not spend more than the available budget 7 . Con- 
straint (15c) secures that no carrier transports more than its trans- 
portation capacity K ld . Moreover, constraint (15d) guarantees the 
non-negativity of y hld and makes sure that HO h does not assign 
more volumes to a carrier than originally agreed in Sub-model 1. 
Finally, constraint (15e) ensures the non-negativity of y h (L +1) d . 
We assume the objective function to be twice continuously dif- 
ferentiable and strictly concave. Furthermore, we deﬁne the feasi- 
ble set K 3 
h 
for each HO h as: 
K 
3 
h ≡ { Y h | ( 15b ) , ( 15d ) and ( 15e ) hold } (16) 
and we let K 3 ≡ ∏ H h =1 K 3 h . In addition, we deﬁne the feasible set S 2 
consisting of the shared constraints as 
S 2 ≡ { Y | ( 15c ) holds } . (17) 
We remark that both K 3 and S 2 are convex sets. Applying the 
same logic as for Sub-model 1, we can derive the variational in- 
equality formulation for the problem. 
Theorem 4 (VI Formulation of Sub-model 2) . A strategy vector Y ∗
is said to be a variational equilibrium of the above Generalized Nash 
Equilibrium game if Y ∗ ∈ K 3 ∩ S 2 is a solution of the variational in- 
equality: 
H ∑ 
h =1 
L +1 ∑ 
l=1 
D ∑ 
d=1 
[
−∂ I h (Y 
∗) 
∂y hld 
− ω A h ·
∂A h (Y 
∗) 
∂y hld 
]
×
[
y hld − y ∗hld 
]
≥ 0 , 
∀ Y ∈ K 3 ∩ S 2 . (18) 
Remark 4 (Existence and Uniqueness of Solution) . A solution Y ∗
to the variational inequality problem (18) is guaranteed to exist 
since the function entering (18) is continuous and the feasible set 
is compact. Furthermore, since the function entering (18) is strictly 
monotone, the solution to the variational inequality (18) is unique. 
Remark 5 (Alternative Variational Inequality to (18)) . Recall the 
Lagrange multipliers associated with the constraints as deﬁned in 
Table 1 . Then, an equivalent variational formulation of problem 
(15a) under constraints (15b) –(15e) is the following one: 
Find (Y ∗, λB 
∗
, λK 
∗
) ∈ R H ·(L +1) ·D + H +(L +1) ·D + : 
H ∑ 
h =1 
L +1 ∑ 
l=1 
D ∑ 
d=1 
[
−∂ I h (Y 
∗) 
∂y hld 
− ω A h ·
∂A h (Y 
∗) 
∂y hld 
+ (c p 
h 
+p ∗hld ) · λB h 
∗ + λK ld 
∗
]
×
[
y hld − y ∗hld 
]
+ 
H ∑ 
h =1 
[ 
B h −
L +1 ∑ 
l=1 
D ∑ 
d=1 
(c p 
h 
+ p ∗hld ) · y ∗hld 
] 
×
[
λB h − λB h 
∗]
+ 
L +1 ∑ 
l=1 
D ∑ 
d=1 
[ 
K ld −
H ∑ 
i =1 
y ∗ild 
] 
×
[
λK ld − λK ld 
∗] ≥ 0 , 
∀ (Y, λB , λK ) ∈ R H ·(L +1) ·D + H +(L +1) ·D + . (19) 
As we did for the variational inequality formulation for Sub- 
model 1, we now provide the standard form of variational inequal- 
ity (19) . In particular, if we let z 2 now be such: z 2 ≡ ( Y , λB , λK ), and 
have the feasible set K 2 be deﬁned as: K 2 ≡ R H ·(L +1) ·D + H +(L +1) ·D + 
7 Note that by considering costs as constraint and not as objective, we avoid the 
issue of economically valuating the suffering of people - a challenging issue requir- 
ing further research ( Holguín-Veras et al., 2013 ). 
with the function F 2 ( z 2 ) that enters the standard VI for- 
mat (14) now deﬁned as: F 2 (z 2 ) ≡ (F 1 2 (z 2 ) , F 2 2 (z 2 ) , F 3 2 (z 2 )) with: 
component hld of F 1 
2 
(z 2 ) = − ∂ I h (Y ) ∂y hld − ω 
A 
h 
· ∂A h (Y ) 
∂y hld 
+ (c p 
h 
+ p hld ) λB h + 
λK 
ld 
( h = 1 , . . . , H, l = 1 , . . . , L + 1 , d = 1 , . . . , D ); component h of 
F 2 2 (z 2 ) = B h −
∑ L +1 
l=1 
∑ D 
d=1 (c 
p 
h 
+ p hld ) · y hld ( h = 1 , . . . , H), and com- 
ponent ld of F 3 
2 
(z 2 ) ≡ K ld −
∑ H 
i =1 y ild ( l = 1 , . . . , L + 1 , d = 1 , . . . , D ), 
then (19) can be put into standard form (14) . 
3. An illustrative example 
In order to illustrate the mathematical model we now pro- 
vide a brief example consisting of two HOs ( H = 2 ), two carriers 
( L = 2 ) and two distribution points ( D = 2 ). In Sub-model 1, each 
HO wants to sign framework agreements covering a volume of 
M hd = 1 . 500 tons per distribution point and wants to limit the to- 
tal volume signed per carrier to G l = 3 . 0 0 0 tons. The unit cost of 
transportation c t 
ld 
is 0.300 kEUR per ton for each carrier and distri- 
bution point, and the reservation price p r 
hld 
is 0.900 kEUR per ton 
for each HO, carrier and distribution point. In Sub-model 2, each 
HO has a budget B h = 5 . 0 0 0 kEUR, and each carrier offers a trans- 
portation capacity K ld = 2 . 500 tons for each distribution point. Fur- 
thermore, each distribution point has needs n d = 5 . 0 0 0 tons and 
transportation spot market rates p h (L +1) d = 0 . 600 kEUR per ton. 
These ﬁve parameters of Sub-model 2 are, however, unknown to 
HOs and carriers in Sub-model 1. For the functional forms used in 
this example and the values of the remaining parameters, please 
refer to Tables 5 and 6 in Appendix A . 
We calculated the equilibrium solution of this illustrative ex- 
ample (and of all its variants in Section 4 ) by solving successively 
variational inequalities (13) and (19) with the iterative projection 
method of Solodov and Tseng (1996) . For details on the solution 
algorithm, please refer to Appendix B . Given the symmetry of pa- 
rameter values, the equilibrium solution is symmetric as well (see 
Table 4 ). In the equilibrium of Sub-model 1, the negotiated frame- 
work agreements include for all combinations of HOs, carriers and 
distribution points identical volumes x ∗
hld 
= 0 . 750 tons and iden- 
tical rates p ∗
hld 
= 0 . 506 kEUR per ton. Then, in the equilibrium 
of Sub-model 2, each HO fully uses the volumes agreed upon in 
the framework agreements ( y ∗
hld 
= 0 . 750 tons) and contracts fur- 
ther volumes of y ∗
h (L +1) d = 0 . 456 tons per distribution point on the 
spot market. Thus, each HO ships to each distribution point a to- 
tal volume of 1.956 tons. However, given the needs n d = 5 . 0 0 0 at 
each distribution point, the total volume of 3.912 tons shipped 
to each distribution point only fulﬁlls 78.2% of actual needs. In 
this case, carrier capacity is not the reason for the shortcoming 
( λK 
ld 
∗ = 0 . 0 0 0 ; l = 1 , . . . , L + 1 , d = 1 , . . . , D ). Instead, both organiza- 
tions are restricted by their budgets ( λB 
h 
∗ = 0 . 309 ; h = 1 , . . . , H). 
This shows how tight budgets can limit the impact of disaster re- 
lief. 
4. Effect of interventions 
In this section, we quantitatively analyze three interventions 
which have been identiﬁed as opportunities for improving the im- 
pact of disaster relief: an increase in competition between car- 
riers, a reduction of transportation costs and an extension of 
framework agreements. As limited competition is a root cause for 
high transportation rates, Lall et al. (2009) propose to develop 
and strengthen service provider markets. This can, for example, 
be achieved by increasing the number of preselected carriers L . 
Furthermore, Teravaninthorn and Raballand (2009) ﬁnd that re- 
ducing vehicle operating costs for fuel, tires, maintenance, labor 
and capital, that is, reducing unit transportation costs c t 
ld 
, should 
yield considerably lower transportation rates. Finally, according to 
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Table 4 
Results of illustrative example. 
Volumes and rates Lagrange multipliers 
l = 1 l = 2 l = 3 (Spot Market) d = 1 d = 2 –
x ∗
hld 
p ∗
hld 
y ∗
hld 
x ∗
hld 
p ∗
hld 
y ∗
hld 
p ∗
hld 
y ∗
hld 
λM 
hd 
∗
λB 
h 
∗
h = 1 d = 1 0.750 0.506 0.750 0.750 0.506 0.750 0.600 0.456 h = 1 0.892 0.892 0.309 
d = 2 0.750 0.506 0.750 0.750 0.506 0.750 0.600 0.456 h = 2 0.892 0.892 0.309 
h = 2 d = 1 0.750 0.506 0.750 0.750 0.506 0.750 0.600 0.456 λK 
ld 
∗
λG 
l 
∗
d = 2 0.750 0.506 0.750 0.750 0.506 0.750 0.600 0.456 l = 1 0.0 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.086 
l = 2 0.0 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.086 
l = 3 0.0 0 0 0.0 0 0 –
Rosenkranz (2017) , practitioners are convinced of the positive ef- 
fects of framework agreements on disaster relief and hope to see 
them more widely used. This can be simulated by increasing the 
volumes M hd which are covered by framework agreements. 
To assess the effects of an intervention, we modify the particu- 
lar parameter of the model and measure the change to the average 
percentage of fulﬁlled needs under equilibrium conditions. We ﬁrst 
demonstrate the implications of each intervention for one speciﬁc 
scenario, the illustrative example from the previous section. Then, 
we analyze the robustness of the results by investigating the 
effects of each intervention for further 21 scenarios (see Fig. 8 in 
Appendix C ). In the ﬁrst robustness analysis, we vary the number 
of HOs in order to assess the inﬂuence of competition between 
HOs ( H = 1 , . . . , 4 ). The second robustness analysis examines 
different levels of symmetry between HOs. In the symmetric sce- 
nario, all HOs have the same demand ( M hd ) and budget ( B h ). In the 
asymmetric scenarios, one HO has 1.5 times (slight asymmetry) to 
3.0 times (strong asymmetry) more demand and budget than the 
other HOs. The third robustness analysis deals with different num- 
bers of preselected carriers and accordingly with different levels of 
carrier competition ( L = 1 , . . . , 5 ). Transportation markets are often 
very heterogeneous and consist of both very big, professional ser- 
vice providers and small, owner-operated carriers ( Teravaninthorn 
& Raballand, 2009 ). Therefore, the fourth robustness analysis 
investigates different levels of carrier symmetry. While in the 
symmetric scenario all carriers have the same capacity ( G l and K ld ) 
and cost structure ( c hld ), in the asymmetric scenario one carrier 
has 1.5 (slight asymmetry) to 3.0 times (strong asymmetry) more 
capacity and 1.5 to 3.0 times lower transportation unit costs than 
the other carriers. Different types of carriers use different types 
of trucks and this is easily visible to HOs. Therefore, and different 
from studies such as Mahadevan, Hazra, and Jain (2017) or Nam, 
Chaudhury, and Rao (1995) , we assume that HOs have complete 
information about these asymmetries. Finally, the ﬁfth and sixth 
robustness analysis examine different levels of spot market rates 
P L +1 and different types of relief items, simulated by different lev- 
els of purchase prices c 
p 
h 
. Unless speciﬁed differently, we keep the 
total volume of framework agreements ( 
∑ H 
h =1 
∑ D 
d=1 M hd ), the total 
available budget ( 
∑ H 
h =1 B h ), the total volume limit ( 
∑ L 
l=1 G l ) and 
the total transportation capacity ( 
∑ L 
l=1 
∑ D 
d=1 K ld ) constant for all 
robustness scenarios. This enables the comparability of results and 
allows to focus our analysis on the effects of competition, instead 
of mixing them with the consequences of increased budgets or 
extended capacities. 
4.1. Increase in carrier competition 
A limited number of service providers achieving disproportion- 
ately high proﬁt margins is one key reason for high transporta- 
tion costs ( Lall et al., 2009 ). According to Lukassen and Wallenburg 
(2010) , stronger competition between service providers decreases 
short-term proﬁt maximization in favor of more long-term ori- 
Fig. 2. Effect of increasing number of carriers - illustrative example. 
ented objectives. Therefore, we analyze the effect of increasing the 
number of service providers, with which framework agreements 
are set up, by calculating the equilibrium values for L = 1 , . . . , 5 . 
4.1.1. Illustrative example 
As Fig. 2 shows, increasing the number of carriers also increases 
the average need fulﬁllment. If more carriers participate in the ne- 
gotiations, the bargaining power of HOs is strengthened and lower 
transportation rates are agreed upon as part of the framework 
agreements. Consequently, the limited budget can be used for pur- 
chasing more relief items instead of paying service providers. If 
both HOs only negotiate with one carrier ( L = 1 ), this carrier uses 
his monopoly-like position and sets framework rates equal to the 
reservation price of both HOs ( p ∗
hld 
= 0 . 900 ). As these in the end 
turn out to be higher than the spot market rates p ∗
h (L +1) d = 0 . 6 
(which is not foreseeable for neither the HOs nor the carrier), both 
HOs decide to only make use of the spot market. If both HOs ne- 
gotiate with two carriers ( L = 2 ), framework rates fall slightly be- 
low the spot market level ( p ∗
hld 
= 0 . 506 ) and, thanks to the use of 
framework agreements, more relief can be provided. Conducting 
negotiations with a third carrier then further strengthens the bar- 
gaining power of HOs. Consequently, framework rates are set close 
to the marginal transportation costs ( p ∗
hld 
= 0 . 337 and c t 
hld 
= 0 . 300 ) 
and a considerable improvement in need fulﬁllment is achieved. 
Given our assumption that carriers will never charge rates below 
their costs, increasing the number of carriers beyond three does 
not strongly improve the average need fulﬁllment anymore, be- 
cause carriers have almost no room left for price reductions. 
4.1.2. Robustness analysis 
Fig. 3 shows that the results of all scenarios are in principle 
comparable to the illustrative example. A variation of H highlights 
the negative effect of competition among HOs and the inﬂuence 
of demand concentration on bargaining power. If only one HO is 
in demand of transportation, it can achieve framework rates equal 
to transportation unit costs already by involving a second provider 
into the negotiations. However, if three or four HOs require 
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Fig. 3. Effect of increasing number of carriers - robustness analysis. 
transportation services, this price level can only be achieved by 
conducting negotiations with ﬁve providers. Investigating different 
levels of HO and carrier symmetry, we can draw two main conclu- 
sions. On the one hand, slight asymmetries in demands, budgets, 
capacities or cost structures do not imply any relevant changes 
compared to the symmetric example. On the other hand, strong 
asymmetries only imply a relevant difference when exactly two 
carriers are involved into the framework negotiations. In case of 
strongly asymmetric HOs, the bigger HO has a quasi-monopolistic 
demand share and can use its bargaining power to obtain prices 
close to marginal costs. In the case of strongly asymmetric carriers, 
the bigger carrier has major costs advantages which are passed on 
as price reductions to the HOs. These economies of scale even out- 
weigh the shift of bargaining power caused by the asymmetries. 
We also assessed the implications of different levels of purchase 
prices and spot market rates. With regard to different levels of 
purchase prices, the results from the illustrative example are qual- 
itatively robust. While the level of need fulﬁllment is consistently 
different, because cheaper products strain the restricted budget 
less, the qualitative course of the graphs remains the same. This 
is also true for different levels of spot markets rates whenever L 
exceeds two. The implications of involving a second carrier, how- 
ever, differ in these scenarios. It allows to switch from spot market 
based transportation to framework based transportation in the 
case of medium or high spot market rates. In the case of low spot 
market rates, however, framework rates still exceed spot market 
rates and framework agreements are not used for transportation. In 
summary, we can state that increasing the number of preselected 
carriers strengthens the bargaining power of HOs and improves 
impact up to a certain limit. The limit is reached when carriers, 
driven by competition, set framework rates equal to transportation 
unit costs. In the case of two HOs, this is achieved when four car- 
riers are involved into negotiations. Increasing competition beyond 
this level does not bring additional beneﬁts. This result is robust 
for different levels of HO symmetry, carrier symmetry, purchase 
prices and spot market rates, but not for different numbers of HOs. 
4.2. Reduction of transportation costs 
High transportation unit costs, caused for example by bad 
roads, unskilled drivers or old trucks, are another important con- 
straint for disaster relief ( Teravaninthorn & Raballand, 2009 ). To 
simulate the effect of reducing transportation unit costs, for exam- 
ple, by investments in driver training or ﬂeet modernization, we 
reduce the parameter c t 
ld 
symmetrically for all preselected carriers 
and distribution points by up to 75%. We assume that HOs have 
full transparency over this change and react to it with decreasing 
reservation prices. This level of transparency can be achieved by 
appropriate contract designs and remuneration forms ( Lim, 20 0 0 ). 
4.2.1. Illustrative example 
Fig. 4 shows that the reduction of transportation unit costs 
leads to an increase in need fulﬁllment. As costs decrease, carriers 
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Fig. 4. Effect of reducing transportation costs - illustrative example. 
pass on parts of the savings to HOs in order to secure their cus- 
tomer satisfaction. According to the principle of dual entitlement 
( Bolton, Warlop, & Alba, 2003 ), HOs would perceive prices as un- 
fair if carriers would not pass on at least parts of the savings. Inter- 
estingly, for cost reductions up to approximately 41%, the observed 
cuts in rates exceed the actual cost reductions. For example, a cost 
reduction of 8.5% ( −0.026) leads to a cut in rates of 0.082. As the 
general cost level falls, carriers need to compensate the increasing 
price sensitivity of HOs by lowering rates disproportionately. These 
disproportionate adjustments occur at a decreasing rate, because 
also the proﬁt margin of carriers shrinks steadily and price cuts 
strain carrier proﬁts more and more. At a cost reduction of approx- 
imately 41%, HOs are price sensitive to such an extent that carri- 
ers set transportation rates equal to transportation unit costs. From 
this point on, all further price reductions lead to a linear improve- 
ment in need fulﬁllment, because carriers have no further room for 
disproportionate cuts in rates. Different to the previous interven- 
tion, however, no upper limit for the improvement in need fulﬁll- 
ment exists when reducing transportation costs. The insights from 
this illustrative example support the claim of Lall et al. (2009) . The 
authors suggest that policy makers should prioritize the improve- 
ment of low quality feeder roads over the enhancement of estab- 
lished road networks on international corridors. Given our ﬁnding 
with respect to the dependency of price sensitivity on the general 
cost level, we also expect basic corrections of low quality roads to 
yield higher improvements than further modernizations of accept- 
able infrastructures. 
4.2.2. Robustness analysis 
As it is illustrated in Fig. 5 , in the case of H = 1 carriers set 
rates equal to transportation unit costs for all cost levels. There- 
fore, cost reductions always imply linear improvements in need 
fulﬁllment. For H = 3 and H = 4 the insights from the illustrative 
example apply with two adaptations. First, small cost reductions 
in Sub-model 1 do not yield any beneﬁt, because framework rates 
still turn out to be higher than spot market rates in Sub-model 2. 
Second, the transition to a linear development of improvements 
occurs at higher levels of cost reduction, because HOs have less 
bargaining power and, in consequence, are less price sensitive. The 
same relationship holds in the opposite direction for L = 3 , . . . , 5 . 
Due to the shift of bargaining power towards HOs, carriers are 
forced to price at marginal costs already for lower levels of cost 
reduction compared to the illustrative example. If two HOs ne- 
gotiate framework agreements with only one carrier ( L = 1 ), the 
carrier sets rates equal to reservation prices of HOs for all sce- 
narios with cost reductions below 55%. In this range, cost reduc- 
tions have ﬁrst no effect, because spot market rates still turn out 
to undercut framework rates in Sub-model 2, and then a linear ef- 
fect, because reservation prices fall proportionally to the general 
price level. Surprisingly, when cost reductions exceed 55%, the car- 
rier stops to capitalize on his quasi-monopolistic position and sets 
rates below reservation prices instead. Due to the extremely high 
price sensitivity of HOs at this cost level, the carrier behaves com- 
parably to the quasi-duopoly of carriers in the illustrative example 
and tolerates disproportionately high price cuts. As for the previ- 
ous intervention, slight asymmetries in demands, budgets, capaci- 
ties or cost structures do not imply any relevant changes compared 
to the symmetric example. In the case of strong asymmetries and 
cost reductions of up to approximately 30%., the improvement in 
need fulﬁllment is lower than in the illustrative example for rea- 
sons of bargaining power and economies of scale (see previous in- 
tervention). Comparing different levels of purchase prices and spot 
market rates, we identiﬁed two noteworthy differences to the il- 
lustrative example. First, if spot market rates turn out to be low in 
Sub-model 2, small reductions of transportation unit costs in Sub- 
model 1 do not yield any improvement for beneﬁciaries, because 
HOs will continue to only use the spot market for transportation. 
Second, in the case of low purchase prices and spot market rates, 
decreasing the transportation unit costs beyond a certain thresh- 
old yields an average need fulﬁllment greater than 100%. Making 
investments in transportation cost reductions under such circum- 
stances does consequently not bring further beneﬁts for beneﬁcia- 
ries, but instead might lead to waste by HOs who want to signal 
their performance to donors. In summary, we can state that trans- 
portation cost reductions have a positive, but decreasing marginal 
beneﬁt with respect to need fulﬁllment for all types of relief items 
and without any upper limit. Under speciﬁc circumstances, which 
are dependent on the number of HOs, number of carriers and 
level of spot market rates, they, however, need to exceed a certain 
threshold before coming to full effect. This effect is highest, when 
the bargaining power of HOs is low. 
4.3. Extension of framework agreements 
Practitioners emphasize the positive inﬂuence of framework 
agreements on disaster relief ( Rosenkranz, 2017 ). For example, they 
help to reduce administrative workload and to safeguard against 
price ﬂuctuations. Therefore, we investigate the effect of extend- 
ing the volume covered in framework agreements by increasing 
the parameter M hd by up to 66%, symmetrically for all HOs and 
distribution points. 
4.3.1. Illustrative example 
According to Fig. 6 , increasing the framework volumes also in- 
creases the average need fulﬁllment. By ﬁxing transportation rates 
in advance, HOs do not have to rely on uncertain spot market 
rates. In this illustrative example, HOs and carriers agree on frame- 
work rates p ∗
hld 
= 0 . 506 in Sub-model 1 which in Sub-model 2 
turn out to be lower than the spot market rates ( p h (L +1) d = 0 . 600 ). 
Therefore, HOs can save budget by making use of the framework 
agreements, which in turn can be spent on purchasing more re- 
lief items. In the initial situation, framework volumes M hd are lim- 
ited to 1.500. Given their budget b h = 5 . 0 0 0 , HOs can afford to 
make complete use of the framework agreements ( x ∗
hld 
= 1 . 500 ) 
and additionally procure transportation services on the spot mar- 
ket ( y ∗
h (L +1) d = 0 . 456 ). With framework volumes increasing, HOs 
procure less and less services on the spot market and improve 
the level of need fulﬁllment proportionally (linear development). 
For M hd = 1 . 988 , which constitutes a 33% increase, HOs spend 
their entire budget for transportation on framework based services 
( y ∗
h (L +1) d = 0 . 0 0 0 ). Further increases of M hd do not yield additional 
improvements, because HOs lack budget to make use of the ex- 
tended volumes. 
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Fig. 5. Effect of reducing transportation costs - robustness analysis. 
Fig. 6. Effect of increasing framework volumes - illustrative example. 
4.3.2. Robustness analysis 
As Fig. 7 shows, increasing M hd does not provide any beneﬁts 
for H = 3 , H = 4 and L = 1 . In these cases, the bargaining power 
of HOs in Sub-model 1 is lower than in the illustrative example. 
This leads to framework rates which exceed spot market rates 
in Sub-model 2. Under these circumstances, HOs do not make 
use of the framework agreements and only procure services on 
the spot market. Therefore, the volume of framework agreements 
does not have any effect on the need fulﬁllment. For H = 1 and 
L = 3 , . . . , 5 the bargaining power of HOs is stronger than in the 
illustrative example. Accordingly, framework rates are smaller, the 
improvements from increasing M hd are comparatively higher and 
budget limitations only occur at higher levels of M hd . The same is 
true for all asymmetric scenarios (demands, budgets, capacities or 
cost structures), where the effect is considerably higher for strong 
asymmetries than for slight asymmetries. In the case of asymmet- 
ric HOs, the bigger HO has quasi-monopolistic bargaining power, 
and in the case of asymmetric carriers, the bigger carrier can 
leverage major economies of scale. In both cases, framework rates 
are disproportionately lower than in the illustrative example and, 
therefore, increases of M hd lead to higher improvements. The three 
scenarios with different levels of purchase prices qualitatively 
conﬁrm the insights from the illustrative scenario. Due to different 
expenses for the procurement of products, different levels of need 
fulﬁllment can be observed in all three scenarios, though. Finally, 
if spot market rates turn out to be low in Sub-model 2, framework 
agreements are not used and changes to M hd do not have any 
effect. If spot market rates are found to be high, the improvements 
from increasing M hd are higher than in the illustrative example. 
However, the threshold imposed by the limited budget remains 
exactly the same. In summary, we can state that increasing M hd 
yields linear improvements in need fulﬁllment whenever frame- 
work rates are below spot market rates and HOs have enough 
budget left to make use of these increases. The improvements are 
highest when the bargaining power of HOs is high, or when spot 
market rates are high. In these cases, ﬁxing rates ahead of time 
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Fig. 7. Effect of increasing framework volumes - robustness analysis. 
allows organizations to secure their impact despite potential price 
increases on the spot market. 
5. Summary and outlook 
In this paper, we developed a game-theoretic model to inves- 
tigate the inﬂuence of transportation rates and framework agree- 
ments on distribution decisions in long-term relief operations and 
to evaluate measures for increasing the impact of humanitarian or- 
ganizations. In order to do so, we have analyzed the equilibrium 
states of our model under different conditions, leveraging the con- 
cepts of (Generalized) Nash Equilibrium, Variational Equilibrium 
and Variational Inequalities. 
We investigated three interventions to improve the fulﬁll- 
ment of beneﬁciary needs: an increase in carrier competition, 
a reduction of transportation costs and an extension of frame- 
work agreements. According to our results, all initiatives provide 
promising improvements. Increasing the number of preselected 
carriers, with which framework agreements are set up, strength- 
ens the bargaining power of HOs and improves impact up to a 
certain limit. The limit is reached when carriers set framework 
rates equal to transportation unit costs. In the case of two HOs, 
this is achieved when four carriers are involved into negotiations. 
Increasing competition beyond this level does not bring additional 
beneﬁts. This result is robust for different levels of HO symmetry, 
carrier symmetry, purchase prices and spot market rates, but 
not for different numbers of HOs. No such upper limit exists 
for reductions of transportation costs. These have a positive, but 
decreasing marginal beneﬁt for all types of relief items. Under spe- 
ciﬁc circumstances, which are dependent on the number of HOs, 
number of carriers and level of spot market rates, they, however, 
need to exceed a certain threshold before coming to full effect. 
This effect is highest, when the bargaining power of HOs is weak. 
The opposite relationship is true when extending the volumes of 
framework agreements. This measure provides the highest beneﬁts 
when the bargaining power of HOs is strong, or when spot market 
rates are high. In these cases, ﬁxing lower rates ahead of time then 
allows organizations to achieve the same impact as they would in 
the case of lower levels of spot market rates. In general, such ex- 
tensions of framework volumes yield linear improvements in need 
fulﬁllment whenever framework rates are below spot market rates 
and HOs have enough budget left to make use of these volume 
increases. For all interventions we found that slight asymmetries 
of demands, budgets, capacities or cost structures do not cause 
results which are considerably different from the symmetric sce- 
nario. Strong asymmetries, however, can entail relevant differences 
and need to be considered by decision makers when assessing the 
improvement potential of interventions. Finally, all interventions 
can also lead to ineﬃciencies when humanitarian organizations 
do not use lower transportation rates to save money, but instead 
over-fulﬁll the needs of beneﬁciaries to signal their performance to 
donors. 
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The presented research has certain limitations and can be ex- 
tended in several directions. Generally, we have focused on com- 
mercial providers of logistics services. In practice, humanitarian 
service providers, such as the UNHRD, have been gaining more 
and more importance ( Vega & Roussat, 2016 ). An extension of our 
model to humanitarian service providers, who do not pursue prof- 
itability objectives, and a comparison with the commercial model, 
would add valuable insights to the related discussion. Similarly, 
our paper investigates situations in which HOs act in an uncoordi- 
nated way and reduce their bargaining power through competitive 
behavior. This is a commonly reported issue, which coordination 
bodies such as the Logistics Cluster would like to solve ( Cottam 
et al., 2004 ). Our model could also be adjusted to simulate how 
such coordinators can best help to increase the impact of disas- 
ter relief and to understand which organizations should best coop- 
erate to leverage maximum synergies ( Cruijssen, Borm, Fleuren, & 
Hamers, 2010 ). Future research could, moreover, extend our analy- 
sis with respect to the uncertainty under which framework agree- 
ments are negotiated. On the one hand, simulations could exam- 
ine the optimality of the decisions in Sub-model 1 for different 
levels of budgets, needs and carrier capacities in Sub-model 2. 
On the other hand, the model could be adjusted in such a way 
that decision-making in Sub-model 1 explicitly considers the un- 
certainty of Sub-model 2, for example the risk that a carrier will 
not deliver the ordered amount. Both approaches would help to 
gain a better understanding of the interdependencies between both 
sub-models. Likewise, our model in principle allows one to ana- 
lyze the effect of conﬂicting HO priorities, asymmetric beneﬁciary 
needs and HO competition for media and donor attention. For rea- 
sons of complexity, we have left these aspects out of our analysis. 
However, it could be interesting for future research to simulate the 
implications of these issues for the optimal setup of framework 
agreements. This could also involve an analysis of the results on 
the level of single actors, as interventions might not have a posi- 
tive effect for all HOs in the case of budget or demand asymme- 
tries. Finally, our model assumed that carriers base their pricing 
decisions on proﬁt considerations and the expected customer sat- 
isfaction with respect to reservation prices. In fact, the literature 
does not yet fully agree on the determinants which should be con- 
sidered for the design of pricing models ( Lukassen & Wallenburg, 
2010 ). Studying the impact of different determinants and pricing 
models on transportation rates would therefore be highly interest- 
ing as well. 
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Appendix A. Functional forms and parameter values 
Tables 5 and 6 summarize the functional forms and parame- 
ter values used for the numerical simulations in this paper. While 
transportation costs C h (X h , P 
∗
h 
) , expected proﬁt E l ( P , X 
∗) and activ- 
ity signal A h ( Y ) are linear functions, the dependency risk R h ( X ) is a 
quadratic function. We provide a brief reasoning for the functional 
Table 5 
Functional forms for numerical simulations. 
Sub-model 1 
Transportation costs of h C h (X h , P 
∗
h 
) = ∑ L l=1 ∑ D d=1 p ∗hld · x hld 
Dependency risk of h R h (X ) = 
∑ L 
l=1 
∑ D 
d=1 r hl · x 2 hld 
Expected proﬁt of l E l (P, X 
∗) = ∑ H h =1 ∑ D d=1 (p hld − c t ld ) · x ∗hld 
Satisfaction with l S l (P) = 
∑ H 
h =1 
∑ D 
d=1 M hd · (1 −
p 2 
hld 
p r 
hld 
2 ) 
Sub-model 2 
Impact of h I h (Y ) = 
∑ D 
d=1 u d · ( 
∑ L +1 
l=1 y hld − 1 2 ·n d ·
∑ L +1 
l=1 y hld ·
(2 ·∑ H i =1 ∑ L +1 l=1 y ild −∑ L +1 l=1 y hld )) 
Activity signal of h A h (Y ) = 
∑ D 
d=1 
(
i hd 
∑ L +1 
l=1 y hld 
)
forms of satisfaction S l ( P ) and impact I h ( X ) below as these are less 
intuitive than the other functional forms and require some further 
background. 
Satisfaction We estimate the satisfaction S hld ( p hld ) of HO h re- 
lated to the transport by carrier l to distribution point d based on 
the ratio of transportation rate p hld and HOs h ’s particular reser- 
vation price p r 
hld 
(see the concept of consumer surplus as utility, 
e.g. Marshall, 1927 ). We assume the satisfaction with a price of 
zero to be 100% and the satisfaction with a price equal to the 
reservation price to be 0%. Furthermore, we assume the satisfac- 
tion to be monotonically decreasing at an increasing rate with re- 
spect to the transportation rate p hld . We then calculate the satis- 
faction S l with carrier l as the sum over the satisfaction of all HOs 
h with the transportation of this carrier to all distribution points d , 
weighted by the particular transportation requirements M hd . This 
implies that HOs’ satisfaction on high volume lanes is more im- 
portant than on small volume lanes. It is a challenging task to 
estimate the reservation price p r 
hld 
as it is inﬂuenced by a mul- 
titude of factors (see e.g. Kohli & Mahajan, 1991 ). For simpliﬁca- 
tion, we focus on two main drivers: bargaining power and fair- 
ness perception. On the one hand, the reservation price decreases 
with an increase in bargaining power ( McKibben, 2015 ) and bar- 
gaining power is positively correlated to the size of an organiza- 
tion and its relative demand share ( Pazirandeh & Herlin, 2014 ). Ac- 
cordingly, we estimate the relative bargaining power b h of HO h 
as b h = 
∑ D 
d=1 M hd 
∑ H 
h =1 
∑ D 
d=1 M hd . On the other hand, the reserva- 
tion price is shaped by perceptions of price fairness. According to 
the principle of dual entitlement, HO h considers a reasonable sur- 
charge on top of the transportation costs of l as fair ( Bolton et al., 
2003 ). Therefore, we call s h the surcharge accepted by HO h and 
assume p 
f 
hld 
= (1 + s h ) · c t ld as the price perceived as fair by h for 
transportation by l to d , that is, we also assume that HO h has full 
transparency over the unit transportation costs of carrier l . This 
could be achieved by appropriate contract designs and remuner- 
ation forms ( Lim, 20 0 0 ). We then calculate the reservation price 
p r 
hld 
as p r 
hld 
= (2 − b h ) · p f hld . Consequently, an organization with a 
relative demand share of 100% will have a reservation price equal 
to the fair price. An organization with a relative demand share of 
0% will have a reservation price twice as high as the fair price. 
Impact . Deprivation costs of disaster victims are monotonic, 
nonlinear and convex with respect to the deprivation time 
( Holguín-Veras et al., 2013 ). A key effect of deprivation time is the 
accumulation of deprivation volume. Therefore, we assume depri- 
vation costs of individuals to also be convex with respect to the de- 
privation volume. Accordingly, the impact of relief supplies, which 
reduce the deprivation volume of individuals, is monotonic, non- 
linear and concave with respect to the volume. A simpliﬁed es- 
timation for the impact I of delivering a volume of Y d to a dis- 
tribution point d with the total need n d is then given by I(Y d ) = 
Y d − 1 2 ·n d · Y 
2 
d 
. According to the humanitarian principle of eq- 
uity, no distribution point should be systematically disadvantaged 
( Gutjahr & Nolz, 2016 ). However, the time without relief supplies 
T. Gossler et al. / European Journal of Operational Research 274 (2019) 126–141 139 
Table 6 
Parameter values for numerical simulations (alphabetically). 
Notation Description Indices Example Scenarios 
B h Budget of HO h ( h = 1 , . . . , H ) 5.0 0 0 2 . 50 0 , . . . , 7 . 50 0 
c t 
ld 
Unit cost of l for transport to d 
(
l = 1 , . . . , L 
d = 1 , . . . , D 
)
0.300 0.075, ..., 0.300 
c p 
h 
Purchase price for h 
(
h = 1 , . . . , H 
)
0.750 0.60 0,0.750,0.90 0 
D Number of distribution points – 2 2 
G l Volume limit for carrier l 
(
l = 1 , . . . , L 
)
3.0 0 0 4.500 
H Number of HOs – 2 1,...,4 
i hd Relative importance of d for h 
(
h = 1 , . . . , H 
d = 1 , . . . , D 
)
1.0 0 0 1.0 0 0 
K ld Capacity of carrier l for transport to d 
(
l = 1 , . . . , L 
d = 1 , . . . , D 
)
2.500 3.750 
K (L +1) d Capacity of spot market for transport to d 
(
d = 1 , . . . , D 
)
∞ ∞ 
L Number of carriers – 2 1, ..., 5 
M hd Target volume of h for d 
(
h = 1 , . . . , H 
d = 1 , . . . , D 
)
1.500 1.500,...,2.498 
n d Needs at d 
(
d = 1 , . . . , D 
)
5.0 0 0 5.0 0 0 
p h (L +1) d Spot market rates for transport by h to d 
(
h = 1 , . . . , H 
d = 1 , . . . , D 
)
0.600 0.450,0.600,0.750 
r hl Relative risk h associates with l 
(
h = 1 , . . . , H 
l = 1 , . . . , L 
)
1.0 0 0 1.0 0 0 
s h Surcharge accepted by h ( h = 1 , . . . , H ) 1.0 0 0 1.0 0 0 
u d Relative urgency of d for h ( d = 1 , . . . , D ) 1.0 0 0 1.0 0 0 
ω A 
h 
Weight of signaling for h ( h = 1 , . . . , H ) 0.200 0.200 
ω R 
h 
Weight of risk for h ( h = 1 , . . . , H ) 0.200 0.200 
ω S 
l 
Weight of satisfaction for l ( l = 1 , . . . , L ) 0.400 0.400 
can make an important difference between distribution points 
( Holguín-Veras et al., 2013 ) and organizations need to balance 
egalitarian and utilitarian objectives ( Toﬁghi, Torabi, & Mansouri, 
2016 ). To take into account the time-dependencies between peri- 
ods we differentiate distribution points based on the urgency of 
needs and weight the impact at each distribution point d with an 
urgency factor u d . Consequently, we can calculate the impact of a 
relief operation, in which H HOs provide the shipment vector Y via 
L preselected carriers and the spot market L + 1 to D distribution 
points, as follows: 
I(Y ) = 
D ∑ 
d=1 
u d ·
⎛ 
⎝ H ∑ 
h =1 
L +1 ∑ 
l=1 
y hld −
1 
2 · n d 
·
( 
H ∑ 
h =1 
L +1 ∑ 
l=1 
y hld 
) 2 ⎞ ⎠ . 
The impact of a single HO h is then the difference between the 
impact of the relief operation with HO h and the impact of the 
relief operation without HO h . Let Y ˆ h be the vector of shipments 
by all organizations except h . The impact I h of one organization h 
in the relief operation is consequently I h (Y ) = I(Y ) − I(Y ˆ h ) and can 
be calculated as follows: 
I h (Y ) = 
D ∑ 
d=1 
u d ·
( 
L +1 ∑ 
l=1 
y hld −
1 
2 · n d 
·
L +1 ∑ 
l=1 
y hld 
·
( 
2 ·
H ∑ 
i =1 
L +1 ∑ 
l=1 
y ild −
L +1 ∑ 
l=1 
y hld 
) ) 
. 
Appendix B. Solution algorithm 
The Solodov and Tseng (1996) method is an iterative projection- 
contraction method, where the second projection is a more general 
operator. The solution vector z τm of sub-model m ∈ {1, 2} in iteration 
τ of the algorithm is the result of the second projection and cal- 
culated as: 
z τm = z τ−1 m − γM −1 (T ατ (z τ−1 m ) − T ατ (P r K (z τ
∗
m )) , 
with γ ∈ R + . The scaling matrix M must be a symmetric posi- 
tive matrix and is used to accelerate the convergence. Furthermore, 
T ατ = I − ατ F m , where I is the identity function, ατ is chosen dy- 
namically such that T ατ is strongly monotone, and F m is the func- 
tion entering the variational inequalities (13) and (19) when they 
are formulated in standard form. Finally, z τ
∗
m is the ﬁrst projection 
in each iteration and is calculated as: 
z τ
∗
m = P r K (z τ−1 m − ατ F m (z τ−1 m )) . 
The Solodov and Tseng (1996) algorithm has less restrictive 
conditions for convergence than many variational inequality algo- 
rithms, and requires only monotonicity of the function F m , with 
the rate of convergence also established in Solodov (2003) for this 
and related algorithms. We implemented the algorithm in MATLAB 
R2016a setting ατ = 0 . 3 τ−1 , γ = 1 . 0 and M = I. We solved, in to- 
tal, 4626 different instances on an Intel(R) Core(TM) i5 CPU with 
2.60 gigahertz and 8.00 gigabytes RAM. Let d τm = z τm − z τ−1 m be the 
vector of differences between the solutions of two consecutive it- 
erations for sub-model m . We stopped the algorithm when the 
Euclidean norm of d τm fell below  = 1 · 10 −5 . Initializing all vari- 
ables as zero, on average 390 iterations were required to solve Sub- 
model 1 and 433 iterations were required to solve Sub-model 2. On 
average, an iteration took 0.005 seconds. 
140 T. Gossler et al. / European Journal of Operational Research 274 (2019) 126–141 
Appendix C. Scenarios investigated with numerical solutions 
Fig. 8. Scenarios investigated with numerical simulations. 
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